1st Anti-Exceptionalism workshop: Logic as science (Nov 18-19)

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The `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic’ project just had its first official workshop, entitled `Logic as science‘. We had great talks and helpful discussions, but also excellent company. We are very grateful to all the speakers for their contributions, and not least to everyone else who came along from the department and elsewhere.

Most likely the workshop talks will result in a special issue on anti-exceptionalism. I will post more information later.

 

Formal Theories of Truth, Logic Colloquium (Leeds 2016)

Dave Ripley and I are organizing a special session on formal theories of truth at the Logic Colloquium this year. The colloquium is in Leeds, July 31st to August 6th, and the deadline for early registration is tomorrow! (May 15th)

The speakers:

Don’t miss it! Let me know if you’re going to be there. Check out the programme here.

Video of my talk at MCMP

There is a video podcast of my talk at the MCMP in December. The talk is entitled `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic’. [The video opens in iTunes.]

Here is an abstract:

Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (2002), Priest (2006a; 2014), Russell (2014; 2015), and Williamson (2013b; 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson, following Quine and Maddy, gives an anti-exceptionalist argument for classical logic, while Priest gives an anti-exceptionalist argument for nonclassical logic. This paper aims to show that both are wrong. By rejecting Williamson’s deflationary account of logical theories, we will undercut his abductive argument for classical logic. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.

Conference: The Normativity of Logic

The University of Bergen just approved funding for my conference on the normativity of logic. The conference will take place June 2017 in Bergen. There will be a call for papers announced in the autumn. More details to follow.

There has been a number of great papers on the normativity of logic in recent years. Florian Steinberger has a draft of a forthcoming SEP entry on the topic that will get you up to speed.