1st Anti-Exceptionalism workshop: Logic as science (Nov 18-19)

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The `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic’ project just had its first official workshop, entitled `Logic as science‘. We had great talks and helpful discussions, but also excellent company. We are very grateful to all the speakers for their contributions, and not least to everyone else who came along from the department and elsewhere.

Most likely the workshop talks will result in a special issue on anti-exceptionalism. I will post more information later.

 

PhD Fellowship in philosophical logic advertised

The University of Bergen has advertised a PhD fellowship attached to my project: Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic. The position is for 3 years, but may be extended to a fourth year with teaching duties. Starting salary is NOK 430 200 per year, and the Norwegian government also offers very favourable benefits.

The job ad with details can be found here. Deadline: 10 June 2016.

Applicants must have an MA in philosophy (or equivalent in logic or other relevant subject). Norwegian language skills are not required.

You can find further details about the project in the project description. Please do get in touch with me if you have questions about the project and the department in general. For questions about the applications procedure, please contact the Head of Department.

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Video of my talk at MCMP

There is a video podcast of my talk at the MCMP in December. The talk is entitled `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic’. [The video opens in iTunes.]

Here is an abstract:

Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (2002), Priest (2006a; 2014), Russell (2014; 2015), and Williamson (2013b; 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson, following Quine and Maddy, gives an anti-exceptionalist argument for classical logic, while Priest gives an anti-exceptionalist argument for nonclassical logic. This paper aims to show that both are wrong. By rejecting Williamson’s deflationary account of logical theories, we will undercut his abductive argument for classical logic. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.

Project description: Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic

I have put the project description for the project Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic online. You’ll find some more background about the anti-exceptionalist tradition in the philosophy of logic, together with a quick outline of the project aims. (The outline follows the Norwegian Research Council’s application template, hence the talk of methods and hypotheses.)

The project will run in the period 2016-2020, funded by the Norwegian Research Council. A PhD position will be advertised with start September 2016. More details soon.