The `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic’ project just had its first official workshop, entitled `Logic as science‘. We had great talks and helpful discussions, but also excellent company. We are very grateful to all the speakers for their contributions, and not least to everyone else who came along from the department and elsewhere.
Most likely the workshop talks will result in a special issue on anti-exceptionalism. I will post more information later.
The Faculty of Humanities of the University of Bergen has awarded me the Young Researcher Award for 2016. It’s wonderful news, and I’m very happy to have been nominated by my great colleagues in the philosophy department.
There is an announcement here (so far only in Norwegian).
On August 14th, the Faculty of Humanities welcomed the new 2016 students. I gave a short speech about what we hope to teach our students in the philosophy preparation course, Examen Philosophicum. The theme I chose was how to detect bullshit, in reference to Harry Frankfurt’s famous essay On Bullshit.
Pilar Terrés, a PhD student from Universitat de Barcelona, is visiting the University of Bergen in the autumn semester. Pilar is writing about one of my favourite topics: logical pluralism and proof theory. She’s giving a talk in the department seminar on September 22nd.
The University of Bergen has advertised a PhD fellowship attached to my project: Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic. The position is for 3 years, but may be extended to a fourth year with teaching duties. Starting salary is NOK 430 200 per year, and the Norwegian government also offers very favourable benefits.
The job ad with details can be found here. Deadline: 10 June 2016.
Applicants must have an MA in philosophy (or equivalent in logic or other relevant subject). Norwegian language skills are not required.
You can find further details about the project in the project description. Please do get in touch with me if you have questions about the project and the department in general. For questions about the applications procedure, please contact the Head of Department.
Dave Ripley and I are organizing a special session on formal theories of truth at the Logic Colloquium this year. The colloquium is in Leeds, July 31st to August 6th, and the deadline for early registration is tomorrow! (May 15th)
- Theodora Achourioti – Amsterdam University College
- Roy Cook – University of Minnesota
- Volker Halbach – University of Oxford
- Lavinia Picollo – MCMP, LMU Munich
Don’t miss it! Let me know if you’re going to be there. Check out the programme here.
On April 18th Jesse (my partner) and I had a daughter. Her name is Hedda, and so far her favourite things include bouncing, nighttime, and animal sounds. I’ve already got a parenting role model in mind.
Here is an abstract:
Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (2002), Priest (2006a; 2014), Russell (2014; 2015), and Williamson (2013b; 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson, following Quine and Maddy, gives an anti-exceptionalist argument for classical logic, while Priest gives an anti-exceptionalist argument for nonclassical logic. This paper aims to show that both are wrong. By rejecting Williamson’s deflationary account of logical theories, we will undercut his abductive argument for classical logic. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.